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Abstract—This paper introduces a novel methodology for
designing efficient and strategy-proof direct mechanisms for
a class of problems, where the user types are represented by
smooth, concave, and increasing utility functions. Such mecha-
nisms facilitate distributed control and allocation of resources.
Hence, they are applicable to diverse problems ranging from
those in communication networks to energy management.
A three-step mechanism design process is presented for
deriving the resource allocation and pricing functionals based
on user bids in an auction setting. The properties of the resulting
class of mechanisms are formally analysed using strategic
(noncooperative) games. Although these mechanisms belong to
the Groves class, they differ from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanisms. The developed design process is illustrated
with analytically tractable examples, which are motivated
by network control problems and use scalar-parameterised
logarithmic utility functions. It is shown that the resulting




Game theory, specifically strategic (noncooperative)
games, study multi-person decision making by taking into
account preferences of individual players (e.g users), who
share and compete for limited resources in a system. They
provide a suitable mathematical approach for formal analysis
and design of distributed optimisation and control systems.
Unsurprisingly, game theory enjoys widespread adoption
by the engineering community. Game theoretic frameworks
have been developed to address various problems such as
rate control, interference management, and power control in
wireless, wired, and optical networks [1], [2], [15] .
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an important solution concept
in strategic games. It is defined as a fixed-point where no
player of a strategic game has an incentive to deviate from. It
follows directly from the action space and utilities of players
through a fixed-point theorem [5] and its elegance lies partly
in its simplicity. However, a Nash Equilibrium can be a very
inefficient solution with respect to a given global objective.
This issue known as price of anarchy or efficiency loss has
been the subject of many investigations [8], [10], [11], [16],
[18]. The problem gets more complicated in the case of
multiple NE, where it is difficult to even define what it means
to have an efficient outcome. Therefore, the focus here is on
a class of strategic games which admit a unique NE solution.
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It is clearly desirable to design mechanisms, which can
be formally analysed using game theory, such that their
outcome is efficient, or the corresponding equilibrium of
the associated game is optimal with respect to a given
global objective [3], [4]. A mechanism designer aims to
develop and implement such an optimal mechanism without
having prior knowledge (possibly except from aggregate
statistics) on participating users’ preferences, which are
captured here by smooth, concave, and increasing utility
functions. The users in the system, modelled as players of
the corresponding game, are free to behave according their to
own private and selfish incentives which may contradict the
global objectives. The problem in this case turns out to be the
information exchange between the mechanism (designer) and
users. If the users have sufficient knowledge on the system
and its operation, they can try to mislead the designer
or manipulate the mechanism such that the outcome is to
their individual benefit in expense of others. This result is
clearly not desirable from a mechanism design perspective.
Therefore, a desirable mechanism has to be not only efficient
but also truth revealing or strategy proof, i.e. the users have
no incentive to mislead the system [6], [11], [12], [14].
The efficiency criterion means that the equilibrium of the
game modelling the mechanism coincides with the maximum
of a given global objective function. The commonly used
“social welfare” of users, which is the (weighted) sum of user
utilities, is chosen here as the global objective function. It is
assumed that the designer does not have even statistical or
aggregate knowledge of user utilities (preferences or types).
Consequently, mechanisms captured by Bayesian games are
not investigated here. The mechanisms developed here are
referred to as truth revealing or strategy proof, if and
only if the corresponding game admits a dominant strategy
equilibrium (DSE), which uniquely reveals the user types
(preferences). A game admits a DSE, if the individual players
choose an action regardless of the actions of others.
This paper presents a novel methodology for designing
efficient and strategy-proof direct mechanisms for a specific
class of problems. The resulting auction schemes are mod-
elled and analysed as strategic games. The goal is then to
ensure that the game admits a unique DSE and it coincides
with the maximum of the sum of user utilities. Hence, the
mechanism is provably efficient and truth revealing (strategy
proof). This result is achieved by carefully choosing the
relevant (resource) allocation and pricing functionals based
on a three-step constructive design process. The design
process is illustrated with example formulations motivated by
network control problems and based on scalar-parameterised
logarithmic user utilities. It is shown that the resulting
mechanisms are indeed both efficient and truth-revealing
(strategy proof).
B. Contributions
The mechanism design approach introduced in this pa-
per is novel and constructive. The mechanisms obtained
differ from the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG)
mechanisms. Furthermore, the constructive nature of the
design process allows derivation of a variety of mechanisms
for different problem formulations. Although the class of
mechanisms designed differ from VCG, they are still efficient
in the sense of maximising sum of player utility functions
and are strategy-proof, i.e. the corresponding strategic game
admits a dominant strategy equilibrium which reveals the
true user preferences. These properties can also be verified
independently by checking whether the specific mechanisms
obtained belong to the general class of Groves mechanisms,
of which VCG is another special case [17].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next
section introduces the underlying model. Section III presents
the main results in the context of auction-based mechanisms.
The paper concludes with remarks of Section IV.
II. MODEL
Consider an auction mechanism where a designer D in-
fluences a finite set, A of users who have private preferences
and compete for limited resources through their bids. It is
possible to represent these preferences using utility functions,
and interpret them as user types. This paper focuses on
sharing of an additive limited resource.1 Each user receives
and pays for a 0 ≤ qi ≤ C share of the total resource C as




The designer tries to achieve a global objective such as
welfare maximisation by making the users reveal their true
utilities. For this purpose, the designer imposes certain rules
and prices to the users agreeing to participate in the mech-
anism. However, the designer cannot dictate user actions or
modify their private utility functions.
In order to formally analyze the considered auction mech-
anism, define an N -player strategic game, G, where each
user i ∈ A makes a bid
xi(qi) ∈ C
2[0, C],
which is defined as a continuous, strictly concave, and twice-
differentiable function of the users share of the resource,
qi, on the interval [0, C]. The function xi represents the
declared preference, utility, or willingness-to-pay of user
i for the resource qi.
1Note that, the users are greedy enough such that the demand for the
resource is more than its availability. Otherwise, there would not be a
resource allocation problem since the designer would have allocated each
user simply its desired amount of resource without affecting other users.
The real utility of the ith user for the received resource
qi is captured by the utility function
Ui(qi) : R → R,
which is also assumed to be continuous, twice-differentiable,
and concave on the interval [0, C]. The focus here is on
direct and truth-revealing mechanisms, where in the ideal
case the users’ bids are their real utility functions.
The designer imposes a pricing signal on the bids of users,
which is formulated by adding it as a cost term to utility
resulting in a quasilinear setting. Hence, the user i has the
quasilinear cost functional
Ji(x) = ci(x)− Ui(Qi(x)), (1)
where ci and Qi are the pricing and allocation functionals
mapping C2[0, C] → R, respectively. Consequently, the user




It is important to note that we assume here price antici-
pating users, who take into account the effect of their actions
on prices ci(x) and act accordingly. This is in contrast with
price taking users who ignore it at least partially, e.g. due to
lack of information.
The Nash equilibrium (NE) is a widely-accepted and use-
ful solution concept in strategic games, where no player has
an incentive to deviate from it while others play according







where x∗−i = [x
∗




i+1, . . . , x
∗
N ]. The NE is at the
same time the intersection point of players’ best responses
obtained by solving (2) individually.
A stronger concept is Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
(DSE), which is defined as
xDi := argmin
xi
Ji(xi, x−i), ∀x−i ∀i,
i.e. the players choose the dominant strategy regardless of
the actions of others.
The designer objective, e.g. maximisation of aggregate
user utilities or social welfare, can be formulated using a
smooth objective function V (x, Ui(x)), where Ui(x), i =
1, . . . , N are user-specific pricing terms and user utilities,
respectively. Thus, the objective function V characterises the
desirability of an outcome x from the designers perspective.
Interestingly, the designer knows user bids x as well as the
mechanism (c and Q), however, has no access to true user
utilities U .
The following definitions describe various properties of a
mechanism and its corresponding game counterpart:
Definition II.1 (Efficiency). A mechanism is said to be effi-
cient if its outcome, i.e. the NE or DSE of the corresponding




where V is the objective function of the designer.
Definition II.2 (Strategy-proof). A mechanism is said to be
strategy-proof, if and only if, the corresponding game admits
a DSE that reveals the true user types (preferences).
Definition II.3 (Revelation). In a strategy-proof mechanism,
each rational user acts according to own true utility or
reveals own true type regardless of the actions of others,
i.e. does not try to mislead the designer.
Note that these definitions are consistent with the proper-
ties of quasilinear mechanisms as discussed in [17].
III. MECHANISM DESIGN
In auction-based mechanisms, the designer uses an al-
location rule in addition to impose a cost on user actions.
Based on this rule, the designer explicitly allocates the users
their share of resources as a result of their bids. Specifically,
the designer D imposes on a user i ∈ A (possibly a user-
specific)
• resource allocation rule, Qi(x), s.t. qi = Qi(x),
• per-unit resource prices, Pi(x),
where x denotes the vector of user bids.
As presented in Section II, each user i aims to minimise
its own cost Ji(Qi(x), Pi(x)), as in (1), while the designer
tries to maximises a global objective V . The interaction
between the designer and users, depicted in Figure 1,
is through a single-step bidding/allocation process in the
auction-based mechanisms defined. Since the users cannot
obtain the resource q directly, they make a bid x for their
own share. Since this is a direct mechanism, these bids are







Fig. 1. An auction-based mechanism, where the designer D imposes a
resource allocation rule as well as prices on users (players) A with the
purpose of satisfying a global objective V .
The main steps for designing an efficient and strategy-
proof auction mechanism are:
1) (efficiency) Define and solve user and designer optimi-
sation problems in terms of resources, q, i.e. identify
the equilibrium and globally optimal point.
2) (efficiency) Align the user and designer problems using
the Lagrange multiplier(s) of the limited resource, i.e.
move the equilibrium to the optimal point.
3) (strategy-proof) Devise the allocation rule (functional),
q, based on the problem alignment and then choose a
pricing functional that ensures a truth-revealing domi-
nant strategy equilibrium (DSE).
User Problem
The ith users individual cost functional Ji(x) in terms of
all user bids x is defined as
Ji(x) = ci(x)− Ui(Qi(x)).
Note that Ji is a functional, which we assume to be Frechet
differentiable at the points of interests. Before proceeding
further, it is appropriate to define the Frechet differential
and derivative for completeness. Let X = (C2[0, C])n be
the space of continuous, concave, and twice differentiable
n-vector functions on [0, C] and define the functional T :
X → R. If for fixed x ∈ X and each h ∈ X , there exists




‖T (x+ h)− T (x)− δT (x;h)‖
‖h‖
= 0,
then δT (x;h) is said to be the Frechet differential of T at
x with increment h. Furthermore, δT (x;h) = T ′(x)h and
T ′(x) is called the Frechet derivative [13].
Taking the Frechet differential [13] of the user cost func-
tional with respect to own bid xi results in




Let Pi and Q
′
i be the Frechet derivatives of ci and Qi,
respectively. Then, the Frechet differential can be written as








δJi(xi, x−i;xi − x
∗
i ) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ C[0, C].
Assuming that the functional Ji is convex, then the local
solution to the user problem constitutes concurrently the
global (non-boundary) solution.
Designer Problem
The designer D aims to maximise the sum of utilities
of users. Clearly the case where the optimal solution is
obtained at
∑
i qi = C is of interest. Otherwise, users can
solve their own problems independently without a need for
a mechanism, i.e. the resource is abundant enough to satisfy
the needs of all users.











qi = C, (4)
in terms of the allocated resources q = Q(x).












where λ > 0 is a scalar Lagrange multiplier. The derivatives
of the Lagrangian lead to
∂L
∂qi
= 0 ⇒ U ′i(qi) = λ
∗, ∀i ∈ A, (5)






qi = C. (6)
Efficiency
Next, the designer problem is solved to obtain the alloca-
tion functional (rule) Q(x) such that the equilibrium point
overlaps with the optimal solution.
Solving the set of equations (5) and (6) from the designer
problem for q yields the allocation functional
Q(x, λ∗(x)) = Q(x),
where λ∗ is defined in (5). This allocation rule defined in
terms of user bids provides a Pareto-optimal solution, if the
user bids are made according their true utilities, Ui.
Strategy-proofness
Finally, the pricing functional Pi(x) is designed in such a
way that the Pareto solution coincides with the DSE of the
game and users are forced to reveal their true preferences.
Define the pricing functional as
Pi(xi, x−i) = xiQ
′
i(x),
where Q′i is the Frechet derivative of Qi with respect to xi.




























If Q′i ≥ 0, then the marginal utility of user i, x
∗
i =
∂Ui/∂qi, is the optimal bid or action that minimises users
cost since δJi = 0 and δ
2Ji > 0 regardless of the bids
of all other users, x−i. Therefore, x
∗
i = ∂Ui/∂qi ∀i is
the DSE of the strategic game, which reveals the true user
utilities (preferences). Thus, the mechanism with the pricing
functional













Note that, the monotonicity condition imposed, Q′i ≥
0, has a very reasonable interpretation. It means that the
allocation to the users will be non-decreasing in their bids,
i.e. the more a user bids, the more (or at least as much as
before) will be her or his allocation.
Example 1
Consider a game where the user utility functions are
symmetric except from a scalar parameter θ,
Ui(qi) = θi log(qi).
This family of user utilities are often used to model user
preferences in the networking literature, e.g. in flow or






From each bid, the designer learns the user parameters θ̂.






































Thus, x∗i = θi/qi, ∀i is the DSE of the corresponding
game, and hence, the mechanism is strategy-proof by Defini-
tion II.2. Furthermore, the mechanism belongs to the Groves
class.
Example 2
The analysis above is repeated for a slightly different
family of utility functions
Ui(qi) = θi log(qi + 1).
Here, it is assumed that θi is sufficiently large for each user














Again, the user bids reveal their utility parameter θ̂. Hence,






The rest of the analysis is similar to that in Example 1










Thus, the game admits a DSE and concurrently the mecha-
nism is strategy-proof.
Example 3
Another common user utility function is





j 6=i qj + σ
(7)
denotes the signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) and
σ > 0 is the noise variance. Such utility functions are
often encountered in transmission power control problems
in wireless networks [7], [9]. In this case, qi represents the
assigned (received or aimed) user power level and
∑
i qi ≤
C is the received sum power constraint for minimising
total interference in the overall system. The objective is to
maximise the aggregate utility of users in terms of SINR.





θi log(γi(q)) such that
∑
i
qi ≤ C, qi ≥ 0 ∀i
is non-convex but can be convexified using a nonlinear
(exponential) transform such that it admits a unique boundary
solution. Then, using the fact that
∑
i qi = C, the problem



















































provide the declared preference parameters, θ̂, which can be
used to solve λ∗ and γ∗ in (8). Thus, the allocation function
Qi(θ̂, λ
∗(θ̂), γ∗(θ̂)) = Qi(θ̂)
is obtained, but can be computed only numerically. The








A mechanism design approach is presented for deriving
a class of efficient and strategy-proof auction mechanisms,
where user preferences are captured by a class of smooth,
concave, and increasing utility functions. A three-step design
process is illustrated with multiple example user utilities that
are commonly used in the network control literature. The
mechanisms obtained as a result of this design process differ
from VCG, yet can be shown to belong to the general class
of Groves mechanisms in certain cases [17].
The results obtained extend the earlier ones with scalar-
parameterised user utilities, where the shape of the user util-
ity functions were assumed to be known by the mechanism
designer. Removing this assumption significantly improves
the applicability of this mechanism design framework to
problems in various fields such as communication networks,
energy management, and network security.
Future research directions include analysis of information
exchange between mechanism designer and users, as well as
extensions of the results to pricing (Pigovian) mechanisms
and multiple constraints.
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